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PEACE! PEACE!

TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

MY LORD,

The grand event, which has just taken place in France, and which is so well calculated to convince all mankind of the folly as well, as the injustice, of using foreign force for the purpose of dictating to a great nation who they shall have for their rulers, or what shall be the form of their Government; this grand event, instead of producing such conviction in the minds of those persons connected with the London Newspapers, Magazines and Reviews, who are called *Cossack writers*; so far from producing such conviction in their minds, this grand event seems to have made them more eager than ever for interference in the domestic affairs of France; and, while the cries of our countrymen at *New Orleans* are yet vibrating on our ears, these men are endeavouring to urge you and your colleagues on to the sending of thousands upon thousands more of our men, and to expend hundreds of millions more of our money, in order to upset a Government which the French nation love, and to compel them to submit to one which they hate, or, at least, despise, from the bottom of their hearts, and with an unanimity absolutely unparalleled.

My Lord, if my advice had been followed, we should have had no American War; the 20 or 30,000 men and the 50 or 60 millions of money, which that unfortunate war has cost us, and which have only, as it turns out, created an American Navy, and exalted the Republic amongst the nations of the world, would all have been saved. The literary Cossacks of London, were, I verily believe, the chief cause of that war. They urged you and your colleagues on to the destruction of the American FORM OF GOVERNMENT. Napoleon being, as they thought, down, never to rise again, they urged you to make war, till you had

put down James Madison, and “DELIVERED THE WORLD of the existence of that EXAMPLE of the success of DEMOCRATIC REBELLION.” “No peace with Madison,” was their cry. Kill! kill! keep killing, till he is put down, in like manner as Napoleon is put down! This was their incessant cry. And, in a short time after Napoleon was exiled to the Isle of Elba, these literary Cossacks published a paragraph, which they inserted in the report of the debates in the House of Commons, as the report of the speech of SIR JOSEPH YORKE, then and now one of the Lords of the Admiralty, in the following words; to wit.—“SIR J. YORKE observed, that although “one great enemy of this country, Bonaparte, had been *deposed*, there was “another gentleman whose DEPOSITI-“ON was also necessary to our interest; “he meant Mr. President Madison; “and with a view to THAT DEPOSI-“TION, a considerable naval force must “be kept up, especially in the Atlantic. “But as to his honorable friend’s opinion respecting the reduction of the “Navy, he wished it to be considered “that a number of shipping were employed in conveying French prisoners “to France, and bringing home our own “countrymen. So much for the occupation of our navy on the home station.—But from the Mediterranean for instance, several three deckers were ordered home, and he could swear that “no practical exertion would be remitted “to reduce the expence of our Naval “Department.”

With what shame! with what sorrow, would these writers, if they had not lost all sense of shame, and all feeling for their country, now look back on their conduct at the time to which I am referring! Instead, however, of feeling shame for that conduct, they are now acting the same part over again; they are now reviving all their old calumnies against the Emperor Napoleon; they are abusing the French army and the French people; they are bestowing on them appellations almost

too infamous to be repeated; and they are calling upon you and your colleagues to make a war of extermination upon that people, unless they will receive and adopt the ruler and the Government appointed, or pointed out, by England. These men called *Mr. Madison* a TRAITOR and a REBEL; and they are now calling *Napoleon* a TRAITOR and a REBEL. They called the Americans *slaves, villains, thieves*; and these appellations with many others, not excepting *cowards*, they are now bestowing on the French people. They now see that you and your colleagues have found it necessary to make a treaty of peace and amity with *Mr. Madison*, whom they called a traitor and a rebel; but, these men are of that description of fools to whom experience cannot teach wisdom, and they are now repeating their cry, *no peace with Napoleon*: no peace till the Bourbons are again on the throne of France; war with the French until they adopt a ruler in whom *we* have confidence.

There is something so unjust in this proposition: something so savage in the very idea of making war for such a purpose: something so arrogant, so impudent, so insolent, that, were it not for the *impotence* of the persons who make it, it could not fail to fill every Frenchman's breast with indignation inexpressible. Nevertheless, having seen the effect of the writings of these men as to the American War; having seen how completely they succeeded in causing the people of England to believe, that it was just and wise to make war for the purpose of deposing MR. MADISON, there is reason to fear, that their present labours will not be wholly ineffectual: that, indeed, it is possible, that they may again succeed in their mischievous objects: and, therefore, I shall endeavour to shew, that the war, which they recommend, would be unjust and hateful in its objects, and, in its consequences, likely to be fatal to our country.

I am aware, my Lord, of the mortification which is now felt in England: I am aware of the acuteness of the sting: I see how difficult it must be for the rejoicers of April last, the wearers of laurel and cockades, the roasters of (female as well as male) and the "*Gallant*" at the Temple in the heroes of the Ser-

entine River, the crawling worshippers of Whiskers and of Jack-boots: I am aware, my Lord, how difficult it must be for these persons, comprising no very small part of those who call themselves the UPPER ORDERS, now to look each other in the face. I am well aware of the fire that must burn in their bosoms, and I pity them accordingly. I am aware, too, of the situation of those public men, who, since the exile of Napoleon, have expressed "their sorrow, that those great statesmen, *Burke, Pitt, and Perceval*, were not alive to witness, and to participate in the general joy at the triumph of their principles." I am aware of the situation of those (amongst whom is the Chancellor of the Exchequer) who have so recently eulogized the Income, or Property Tax, upon the ground of the complete triumph which it had enabled us to obtain over Napoleon, and of the fair prospect which it had given us of a long and prosperous peace. I am, above all, aware of the feelings of yourself, my Lord, who have acted so high a part in the exiling of Napoleon, who have been so loudly cheered on that account; who, after detailing the grand views and proceedings of the different powers at the Congress of Vienna, told the House of Commons, on MONDAY, the 29th of this month of March, that our great and enormous sacrifices had purchased a fair prospect of happy tranquillity for us and for Europe, for twenty years to come: and who learnt, on the NEXT WEDNESDAY, that Napoleon was again at the head of the French nation, *Louis le Desiré*, having already reached Abbeville on his way out of France! I am well aware of the existence and of the powerful effect of all these feelings: but, still I do not abandon the hope, that the disappointment, the mortification, the shame, the blind rage of the herd of Napoleon's haters will not be able to induce you and your colleagues to listen to the dictates of passion instead of those of reason, and to plunge your country into a new and fatal war.

There are too objects very distinct, for which the literary Cossacks are calling for war: the first is, to put down and destroy Napoleon and to compel the French people to submit to the Bourbons: the second is, to secure Belgium to the new king of the Netherlands, who, only on the 16th of this present month,



took upon himself, formally, the sovereignty of the Belgian provinces. I am against war for *either of these objects*. I think, that, for neither of them, nor for both together, we ought to go to war; and, I now proceed to state the reasons upon which that opinion is founded.

As to the *first* of these proposed objects of war, the case is this. For more than a century, the French people had been objects of contempt with the people of England, because the former patiently submitted to arbitrary and oppressive government, ecclesiastical as well as civil. I appeal, not to our songs and theatrical pieces (though no bad criterion), nor to our paintings and prints; but, to the most approved historical, political, and moral writings in our language, and to the speeches in both Houses of Parliament. I appeal to these for proof of the fact; that, up to the year 1789, the English nation held the French nation in contempt on account of their patient submission to an arbitrary king, who could imprison or exile any of them at pleasure, and to a cormorant priesthood, who, in a great degree, devoured the fruit of men's labour. In short, it is notorious, that, previous to the year 1789, *Frenchman* and *Slave* and even *Coward* were, in the minds of Englishmen, almost *synonymous terms*. In 1789, the French nation began to make a *change*, or *revolution*, in their Government, and expressed their determination to have perfect *freedom*. Between the beginning of this year and the summer of 1791, many schemes of Government were proposed; and, at last, one was agreed on and formally accepted by the king. But, in spite of the king's acceptance, his BROTHERS, *Louis le Desiré*, and the *Comte d'Artois*, together with the other Princes of the family, went out of France, and, from places on the borders of that kingdom, issued *their protests* against the King's acceptance of the Constitution. In these protests they declared their resolution to upset the constitution by force of arms if they could, and if force should be necessary. At length, in 1792, the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia marched an army into France, under the late Duke of Brunswick, who issued a proclamation, stating it to be his intention to "*restore the King of France to his legitimate power*," and threatening to inflict on the people the most terrible punishments if

they opposed him. This step enraged the people; they soon after put the king and queen to death. They marched against the Duke of Brunswick and his Germans; beat them, and began that series of conquests, which have made France so famous and so much feared in the world. It is well known, that divers changes in the internal government of France had taken place previously to the time when Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor of that country. It is also well known, that he was exiled in April 1814; and, that, while the Capital of France was occupied by an army of Austrians, Prussians and Russians, *subsidized by us*, the eldest brother of the late king of France was brought to Paris *from England*, put upon the throne, and made ruler of France instead of Napoleon.

Now, then, my lord, let us take a view of *our conduct*, through this series of years, as far as relates to the *internal government of France*. At the out-set, the French expected us to be the *first* people on earth to congratulate them on their newly-acquired freedom, and the very last in the world to find fault with them for over-stepping the real bounds of liberty. They soon found their mistake; for, Mr. Burke, whose profound wisdom the Chancellor of the Exchequer has, within a few weeks, so highly extolled, attacked the French people, in speeches in Parliament and in pamphlets, so early as 1791, two years before the king was put to death. Mr. Burke called upon England and all other powers of Europe to make war upon the French people; and, Mr. Burke, soon after this, had a pension granted him of 3,000 pounds sterling a year.

When France was invaded in 1792, and a great emigration took place from that country, the emigrant nobles and priests were received in no country with so much kindness as in England: and, it is notorious, that we paid them *pensions* from that time to the time of their death, or their return last year. It is equally notorious, that we have employed many of these emigrants, as officers, or soldiers, in our wars against France.

When we began our first war, in 1793, we professed to have *no desire to interfere in the internal government of France*. We complained of her *disorganizing* principles, which, we said, threatened the overthrow of all *regular governments*;

and, that, therefore, our war against her was a war of *self-defence*. Of late years, our tone has been wholly changed. We no longer talk of the *disorganizing principles* of the French. On the contrary, we have, of late years, represented them as living under a *most horrible despotism*. We have been constantly talking of the *iron sceptre* of Napoleon, and *pitying* the poor wretches who lived under it. It was not against the French people, we said, that we were making war: but against the "*tyrant*," as we called him, who had loaded them with chains, and to free the poor creatures from which chains was one of the benign objects for which we and our allies, the Russians and Germans marched into France.

How stands the case, then? Up to the year 1788 inclusive we despise the people of France, because they are *slaves*, under the reign of the Bourbons. When they throw off the authority of the Bourbons, we call them *anarchists and rebels*. When they choose an Emperor, we again call them *slaves*: and when we succeed at last by the aid of an immense army of Russians and Germans, in putting the Bourbons on the throne again, we say, that we have restored them to *liberty*. Now, my Lord, if I were to grant this latter assertion to be true, I should not be less disposed to object to a war for the second restoration of the Bourbons: because the French people themselves are the best judges of the sort of ruler that they shall have, and because it is now impossible to deny, that their choice is in favour of Napoleon.

If, indeed, Napoleon had landed with a numerous army: if, by any extraordinary means, a considerable army had been prepared to join him on his landing: if there had existed an insurrection in the country previous to, or on his landing; in either of these cases, there might have been doubt with regard to the free sentiments of the people; but, the country is perfectly quiet; no rising, no disturbances, any where; the whole country is in the hands of Louis's officers, civil and military; and Napoleon lands and rides on to the Capital, not only *without an army*, but in as defenceless a condition as if he had been a private gentleman coming home to his estate. For eleven long years we represent him as hated and detested by the

people of France, whom we represent as suffering all sorts of oppression under him. We represent the conscripts dragged in chains to his armies; we represent the land as become fruitless for the want of tillage; we represent the disconsolate fathers and mothers rending the skies with execration on the murderer of their beloved children; we represent the country as being full of Bastiles and these filled with prisoners like the dungeons of the Inquisition. These representations the far greater part of the people of England really believe; and they rejoice at his fall and his exile. Well, *le voilà exilé!* It is done. He is exiled. The Bourbons are restored. We are immediately told, that all France is happy; that the government of *Louis le Desiré* is a "*paternal*" government; that law, religion, liberty and happiness are restored to a people, so long oppressed. The Bourbons have the government in their hands for a year; they pass laws, make a new constitution, grant rewards, appoint officers, reorganize the army, garrison all the towns, have all the treasure and all the power of that vast and populous country in their hands; and, at the end of the year Napoleon lands with eleven hundred men, the people flock around him in every direction, he proceeds along the great road 569 miles from Cannes to Paris, and though proclamations, decrees and orders, and promises of immense rewards are poured forth against his life, not a single man does all France contain to hold up a hand against him! and, amidst the acclamations of millions, he comes, without a sword to protect him, to resume his authority! Ah! my Lord, feel as we will; say what we will, this is the grandest, the most magnificent spectacle, that ever presented itself for the contemplation of the human mind.

Of all the triumphs that TRUTH ever obtained, this is the most signal. For eleven years almost all the *presses* of England, and, indeed, of the greater part of Europe; half the presses of America; the makers of harangues; the political preachers, were at work to cause it to be believed, that Napoleon was the cruellest tyrant that ever blackened the page of history; and, since his fall, the calumnies which have been poured out on him by the presses and the speechmakers of England, Germany, and France, exceed, perhaps, all that were ever uttered before

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since the art of printing was discovered. The pencil has been brought into the aid of the pen, in order that those who could neither read nor hear, might imbibe against him hatred through their eyes. And, as if the exertions of the French partizans of the Bourbons were insufficient in that country, it has been inundated with Englishmen and English women, who looked upon it as a duty to their native land to aid in the promulgation of these calumnies. Yet, such had been his conduct towards the people of France, that he had only to present himself to their eyes to blow all these calumnies to the winds. To give to him and to TRUTH this triumph, there were wanted his exile and his return. Had these not taken place, the deep impressions of falsehood would never have been removed. Until now, it has been deemed, in England, almost a crime to express a doubt of his having been a monster of tyranny, held in the utmost abhorrence by the people of France. Did TRUTH ever before gain such a triumph!

These events will soften, if not wholly do away, the enmity of only fair enemies, the Republicans of France. For it cannot now be pretended, that he does not reign by virtue of the peoples' consent and choice, signified in the freest and most unequivocal manner. The light, in which he now stands, is very different indeed from that in which he stood before. He was *chosen* Emperor; but the choice was made, it was said, by persons appointed by himself: that he had all the power and all the treasure of the country in his hands at the time; and, in short, that his election was like some *other elections*, the character of which are too tender to be touched by a pen so rude as mine. This was what was said *before*; and this cannot be said *now*: for, if he be not now fairly *chosen* by the people of France, never was man fairly chosen in this world. In *his* proclamations he rests his authority upon the will, the choice of the people; he says he owes, and will owe, that authority and his rank to them and to them only. The Republicans, therefore, cannot now have the same objections to him which they had before. Besides, as I have more than once observed, his government, though the Chief be an Emperor, is essentially Republican. No titles but such as are the reward of services and talents; no hereditary ma-

gistracy; no dominant church; no feudal tenures; no privileged orders; one Code civil and criminal, to which all men are alike subject; no borough elections. In short, France has a republican government with a Chief called an Emperor. And, though that government is not yet, and never may be, precisely what it might be wished, it is likely to come as near to the standard of liberty as the character and genius of the French people, and the state of Society in France will permit. This is, at least, my hope; and, if I am not disappointed, is there any one who will say, that the late event is not to be hailed with joy? However stiff the republicans of France must be; however angry that their own plans of government are not adopted, they must be convinced, that, if the Bourbons had remained, their hopes would have been blasted for ever; and that, therefore, as long as the question lies between the Bourbons and Napoleon, it is their duty, upon their *own principles*, to be for the latter. It must give any friend of Freedom great satisfaction to see, that, in all the proclamations and decrees of Napoleon, and even in the address of the Imperial Guard, signed by M. DROUET, the great principle is always put forward, of the *right of the people to choose their ruler*, a principle to which if they adhere, the French will be a happy and free, as well as a great nation.

This event, so honourable to Napoleon, is little less honourable to the people of France. They had all possible temptations held out to them to oppose him, to take him, to kill him. Not a man; not a single man was found to yield to any of these powerful temptations. Threats were dealt out largely on the other hand. They were continually reminded of the great foreign armies ready to invade France: they were told that the Prussian army was advancing upon Thionville; that the Austrians were already at Turin; that 600,000 Russians, with the Cossacks at their head, were on their march; and, lastly, that 70,000 English, with the Duke of Wellington for commander, were on their way from Belgium. The people of France seem to have heard of the approach of all these armies with as little concern as if they had been told of the approach of so many mice. They seem to have said: "Give us, only give us Napoleon, and let the world come in *arms against us*." And is it for us, for

Lord, to think of dictating a government to such a people?

There is another characteristic in this great event, which is worthy of particular remark: that is the absence of all bloodshed and violence. The Bourbons were not only suffered to depart without harm, but, they appear to have experienced not any obstruction, or even insult, on their journey. It is no more than just to suppose, that their conduct has been such as to excite no very great degree of hatred against them: but, however good their conduct might have been, we know, that under such circumstances, the persons of the falling party have seldom escaped with their lives. This example of forgiveness seems, however, to have been given by Napoleon himself, who, in his proclamations, disclaims all *vengeance*, and generously repays with a general pardon and oblivion all the calumnies against him, and even the instigation to murder by setting a price upon his head. It will give me great pleasure to find, that the family of Bourbon have experienced no ill-treatment of any sort; because, in that case, the conduct of the French people, upon this memorable occasion, will form so striking a contrast with that of our Cossack writers, who, from the hour of Napoleon's exile to that of his return, hardly let one day pass without inculcating the necessity of destroying him. Their hypocrisy could never make them disguise their malice. It was their object to make the world believe, that he was so much hated in France and the Bourbons so much beloved, that there was not the smallest danger of his being able to give the latter any trouble. It was their object to make the world believe, that he was sunk into complete contempt. Yet, in spite of their hypocrisy, their malice broke out into continual insinuations, that his *life* was an *evil*. What a contrast do the conduct of Napoleon and that of the French people form with the conduct of these writers!

The conduct of the Bourbons was not what they *promised*. They promised, that they would leave *property* as they found it: and, they immediately set to work to restore part of the National Property to the Emigrants, who had been abroad, if not serving against France, for 25 years. They promised that there should be *liberty of the press*; and, they immediately put that press under a *censorship*, while

they imprisoned and fined many of the printers and public writers. They promised that in matters of *religion* all men should be free to follow their own opinions, as they had been before: and, they punished men for promulgating religious opinions contrary to those professed by the priests. One man, in particular, was *imprisoned for five years* for uttering what was termed *blasphemous language*, and that, too, in a country where the King was daily creating men *Knights of the Holy Ghost!* It is from our own newspapers: from the mouths of the friends of the Bourbons, that we have this account of their conduct: and, when I heard of the landing of Napoleon, the first thought that came athwart my mind was, that now those men who had been imprisoned for *LIBELS* would be restored to freedom, an object worth, of itself, a little revolution. The truth is, that, from the moment the Bourbons landed in France, our Cossacks were engaged in instigating them to acts of oppression. They pointed out to them victim after victim: they dictated to them whom they should punish and whom they should reward. The Bourbons were beset with these English dictators, whose will they appear to have but too faithfully obeyed. But, the better, the less offensive, the conduct of the Bourbons was, the greater is the triumph of Napoleon: for, it is now certain, that however *good* they might be, the French nation had found him to be *better*.

Much has been said, in our daily vehicles of falsehood, of the ill-treatment, which the English people in France have experienced. If this be true, as I hope it is not, it has, without doubt, been owing to their restless tongues: to that incessant abuse of Napoleon, which they learnt at home, and which they must have been impatient to perceive was not in fashion in France. In general they would naturally be of that description of persons, who went to enjoy the spectacle of seeing the French nation again subjected to the sway of the Bourbons: to indulge in the vindictive joy of seeing the conquerors of Europe subjected to the sway of those who had been protected by England. It is very probable, that, amongst all the feelings which have operated in favour of Napoleon's return, those excited by English arrogance have not been the most feeble and ineffective.

And, my Lord, I think we may be well assured, that, if there were still wanting any thing to endear him to the people of France, that thing would be an attempt, on our part, to drive him again from his throne.

It was said, during the war against the French Republic, that we did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of France: but, that, *our own safety* required us to war against those whose principles, if we were at peace with them, would subvert our excellent constitution in Church and State. It is curious to observe how the same sort of doctrine is cooked up again, or as the French would call it, *rechangé*, for the present occasion. We do not want, not we, now to interfere in imposing a Government upon the French; they might have Napoleon to scourge them for their sins, and we should be glad of it; but, we must *take care of ourselves*: and, as he is a dangerous man to us, we ought to march into France ourselves, and call out all our Russian and German allies to go along with us, to compel the French people to take back the Bourbons, who are a good and peaceable sort of people. In other words, we do not pretend to have a right to *dictate* a Government to the people of France; but, unless they take the Government that we choose for them, we have a right to *go to war with them*. With persons, who have the folly, or the impudence, or both, to hold such a doctrine it would be useless to attempt to remonstrate; but, your Lordship will, doubtless, look back a little at what the late wars have cost us. We did, indeed, place the Bourbons on the throne of France, at the end of 21 years of war; but, in what a condition has the enterprise left us? Are we prepared to add another 700 millions to our National Debt? Are we prepared to continue the Property Tax? Are we prepared for 21 years more of sacrifices?

There is something truly ominous in the similarity of the state of things now to that of things in 1792. The French Princes were then hovering on the Northern frontier of France; they were then hoisting the white flag at Coblenz; and we are told, that they are now to hoist it at Brussels. The Austrians and Prussians were then marching to their aid; and, we are told, that they are now to march to their aid. Is it not evident,

that, if there wanted any thing to unite the people of France; to give them a degree of alacrity and of courage greater than ever were witnessed in any other people, it would be a repetition of the attempts of 1792 and 1793? I know, that it is said, that the Powers of Europe are better prepared, than they were in 1793; that their armies are all on foot; and that they have not forgotten that they have very recently marched to Paris. Granted that they be ready, and that we be ready with the necessary *subsidies*. But, let it be borne in mind, that Napoleon has 2, if not 300,000 veteran troops in France *more* than he had last year; that the treaty, which his presence of mind, his deep diplomacy, pointed out to him, has restored to him such an army as the world never before saw; that he has obtained by that treaty more means than he, at any one time, ever before possessed; and that, along with these immense means, he has in the eyes of all the world, but especially in those of France, acquired a reputation and has obtained claims to greater confidence than at any former period of his wonderful career. His restoration, and more particularly the manner of it, clearly shews to every one, that he can place implicit reliance on his people. He needs no garrisons in the interior; scarcely a guard at Paris; all the mighty means of France he may safely draw towards the frontiers, and there pour them forth upon the first assailant. Very different indeed, then, is the situation of France from what it was in March and April 1814. In short, the conquerors of Amsterdam, Berlin, Hanover, Vienna, Rome, Madrid and Moscow are all again, and that, too, under the same chief, ready to repeat their march; and let the blame fall on those, who shall give them any fair pretence for the repetition. For my part, I am for giving them no pretence at all, and, therefore, I am against all attempt at interference, even in words, in the internal affairs of France. I am for none of the half hostile measures of 1792; I am for cordially receiving his ambassador, if he send any, and, in short, for doing every thing consistent with our honour, calculated to prevent a renewal of war.

With regard to the other proposed object of war; namely, the securing of

Belgium to the new king of the Netherlands, we do not yet know, that Napoleon will demand the restoration of those provinces to France. But, I will frankly confess, that I believe, that he never will rest satisfied until he has obtained that restoration, in the desire to effect which object he will be heartily joined by the whole of his people. The question, then, is, ought we to go to war with him if he demand, and if he endeavour by force to effect, that restoration? I say, NO. I am of opinion, on the contrary, that we ought immediately to withdraw our army; to send home the Hanoverians; and to leave the Belgians and even the Dutch to defend their country against the French, or, again to unite themselves to the French.

I know how some people will stare and blow out their cheeks and snap their mouths at this, as if they were going to bite one's head off: but, you, my Lord, who are a cool, sensible man, are aware, that, if I can offer any solid reasons for this opinion, the opinion ought to have some weight, and that it *will* have some weight. In order that these reasons may have their fair chance, I must trouble your Lordship with a few preliminary remarks. I know that I am here about to attack your Lordship's darling project; that you will cling to it like the fond parent to an only child: but attack it I must, seeing in it, as I do, the cause of endless war, expense and misery.

By Belgium I mean all that country, which, it seems, has, by the Congress, been taken from France and given to the new King. It is not all *properly* so called: but, one name is better than three or four, if it answers all our purposes as well. This Belgium, before the French Revolution, belonged to the House of Austria. It was conquered from that House by the brave and insulted Republicans of France, who also conquered other countries, not belonging to the House of Austria. By and by, peace was made between these powers. Austria confirmed Belgium to France by treaty, and received from France other of her conquests in return. This was nearly twenty years ago. Belgium has belonged to France from that time to the month of May last, when the King of France, by the Treaty of Paris, concluded while the Russian and German Armies were there, gave it up to be disposed of as the Congress

should determine. And, we must observe here, that Napoleon might have retained his throne, if he would have consented to do the same thing. He refused; the war was pushed on; he was overpowered and exiled: and Louis le Desiré gave up to us and our allies that Belgium, which had been won by France, during the time that he was absent from France. So that, it must be evident, to lose this part of their Empire must be very galling to the French.

But, you will say, and with very good reason; what is their soreness to us, if it be for *our good* to keep them out of Belgium? Now, my Lord, I do not say, that it is not *desirable* to us, that the French should be kept out of Belgium; but, I am convinced, that it would be much better for us that Belgium should return under the sway of France, than that it should belong to a power, which, without our aid, *without our constant assistance*, never can keep it for any length of time. When Belgium belonged to the House of Austria, then, indeed, there was a power with half a million of soldiers at its command to defend Belgium. This power was *unable* to defend it; and, if such a power could not keep it out of the hands of France; if Austria was glad to get rid of the burthen of its defence, how is it to be defended by "the King of the United Netherlands," who took the Royal title on him only on the 16th instant, and who has been made a King in that Holland, which was before so proud of its Republican institution and liberties.

Belgium, we are told, is a *barrier* against France. A barrier to protect *whom*, and *what*? For an answer to this question, I will refer to your memorable Speech, made on the very day on which the Emperor Napoleon entered Paris. Your reporter makes you say, in that speech;—"With respect to Holland, it was evident that nothing could be of greater importance to this country, than that France should not have a continuity of sea-coast extending along the whole of the Netherlands. He had the satisfaction to say, that the Allied Powers on the Continent were not more convinced of the importance of this point to us, than to themselves; and therefore all were agreed that the union of the Netherlands with Holland was one of the most important improvements of the face of Europe in modern times. Neither was it consider-

“ed by them as a concession to Great Britain, or to the Prince of Orange in particular, but was most cordially listened to as a means of *strengthening the equilibrium of Europe. A kingdom would thus be formed powerful in all the resources of soil, commerce, navigation, and military strength*; and he had the satisfaction of stating that no Sovereign ever resumed the exercise of his functions who displayed more industry and talent in calling forth all the resources of Holland, and uniting into one, its various parties, than the Prince of Orange had done. He hoped that this kingdom would be sufficiently strong, both from nature and art, *and in future to be able to resist any assault either from the north or the west, at least until other powers came forward to its support.* He trusted it would not be supposed that any *undue concessions* had been made, with the view of obtaining an *increase of territory to Hanover.* On this point there had always been some degree of jealousy in this country; but he was rather inclined to think that Hanover had generally speaking *suffered more than she gained from the connection.* Its people had recently proved themselves faithful supporters of Great Britain; and he would say, that there had not been a more efficient, more faithful, and honest body of men in our service than the *Hanoverian Legion*; they amounted to not less than 12,000 men, to which number they had always been kept up by voluntary enrolment, and it was not too much to say, that the absence of such a corps might have had a most injurious effect on our military exertions. The preservation of the importance of Hanover, as a constituent state of Germany, should, therefore, *be dear to us, as well in this point of view, as from its connexion with our reigning family.* The increase of territory she had received, *tended to consolidate her connexion with this country, by the extent of sea coast which it gave her*: while liable to be intercepted from this country, her efficiency was less considerable. From the moment she was also *in close contact with Holland for an extent of 150 miles,* this naturally contributed to *strengthen and protect her.* Neither was this a connection of which our continental allies were at all disposed to feel jealousy. They were thoroughly convinced

“that no interest was felt so strongly in this country, as the conservation of the general liberties of Europe.”

Such, then, is to be the use of Belgium! Belgium is to cover the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is to cover the Kingdom of Hanover, “which should be very dear to us!” I will pass over your episode on the *Hanoverian Legion* and on the character of the Prince of Orange, as matters too high for my pen; but, really, I cannot refrain from saying, that this scheme, this darling scheme, which you seem to think so advantageous to England, and the account of which seems to have given so much pleasure to your Honourable Hearers; seems to have wrapt them in wonder at your surprising skill, penetration, and grandeur of views; I cannot refrain from saying, that this scheme appears to me to be one of the weakest that ever entered the head of mortal man; and, which is a great deal worse, fraught with endless calamities to England, because it *must* be a source of continual war and expence.

You say, that this new Kingdom (which by the bye, has not yet actually been organized) will be able to “*resist any assault,*” at least “*till other powers can come to its support.*” So this King, like a Watchman, is, when danger approaches, to spring his rattle, and call others in to his assistance! My good Lord! pray keep yourself cool; but, really, such a scheme! such a scheme was never before thought of in this world.

I will not enquire, whether the Belgians, the Dutch, and the Hanoverians would be better off under these arrangements, than if they were under the French; and, I will, for argument's sake, allow, that if Belgium be yielded to the French, the Kingdoms of the Netherlands and of Hanover will soon be blown into very thin air. But, what I contend for is, that, to keep Belgium from France *England must constantly keep on foot a great army in the country*; rather than which, it is my opinion, that we ought to suffer the French to regain, not only those countries, but *all* the countries which they possessed in 1813. I am far from *wishing*, that they should possess all those countries; but it would be preferable to our being involved in continual war.

In truth, my Lord, military achievements have turned our heads. We have

gone on from step to step, till, at last, we really seem to conceit ourselves a greater *military* than we are a *naval* power. Too many amongst us seem to look with sorrow on any thing which shall deprive us of all excuse for keeping up a great army. Never was there seen so much reluctance to lay aside the gorget and the sash. We have fallen into a set of notions quite foreign from all our former notions. We are military-mad; and, in the midst of the rage, we seem almost to forget the *fleet*, the defence which reason and nature so clearly point out to us.

Continental connexions, against which our forefathers were so anxious to guard, are now really sought after with eagerness; and, indeed, full of the notion that it was *we*, who reduced France, we seem to think it necessary, that we should become almost an integral part of the continent. To defend the kingdom of Hanover, we must first defend the King of the Netherlands. To defend the kingdom of the Netherlands we must *constantly* keep a large army on foot in the Netherlands, and more troops ready to go to the assistance of that army. That country must always be filled with troops in our pay, in peace, or in war. And, is this nation in a state to support such an expense?

Shall I be told, that no peace can be *safe* which leaves Belgium in the hands of France? *You*, my Lord, will hardly tell me so, who defended the *peace* of *Amiens*, which left *Belgium* in the hands of *France*; nor will the Earl of Liverpool, who *made* that treaty, and who contended, in its defence, that the *extension* of *territory* which France had gained *had not rendered her more formidable to us*. Come back, then, to your former doctrines: disclaim all connexion with a continent where we never can have power without the ruin of this island; and then we shall have peace; the fund-holders will be paid; our fleet will still be our bulwark: we shall prosper and shall be as great as France.

But, if war is again to be our lot; if we are to send out armies to fight amidst the fortresses of Belgium; if millions are to be expended in the kingdoms of the Netherlands and of Hanover: if a war without prospect of termination; and almost without a clearly defined object is to be our lot, whence are the means to come? What new sufferings are in store for us?

It is well known to your Lordship, that the rejoicing of the people at the late peace arose chiefly from the hope of their being relieved from the long-endured burdens of the war. It is well known to you, that, even in *peace*, our resources, without the war taxes are insufficient. It is well known to you, that *loans* are in contemplation to supply, in part, in *peace*, the absence of the Property Tax. What, then, is to be the fate of the fund-holder, if a new war is now to be our lot?

However, I perceive, and I perceive it with indignation, that there are persons, who are willing to sacrifice even the fund-holders, to send them forth to beg, to spread general ruin and misery over the country, rather than not enter into a new war. I have seen the following alarming words, printed in a very conspicuous manner in the *COURIER* Newspaper of Tuesday last. They are words which every man in England ought to see; and which ought to draw forth the unanimous voice of the people, in a constitutional manner, against entering upon any war, not absolutely necessary to the safety of the country and His Majesty's crown.

"In contemplating so great an evil, as war under any circumstances must be, though it may be a blessing by comparison, our means of maintaining the contest should be considered. And first, the war, independent of its justice and necessity, will have the public voice on its side, even more than in France it can have. Our naval and military men with their connexions, forming nearly as large though not so absolute a part of the governing class of society, will meet war with smiles. Our landed gentry and farmers will secretly welcome it, as it brought them so much profit before. Our shipping and commercial interests it will, as hitherto, favour, while our navy secures us the sovereignty of the seas. Our artizans and labourers had their wages raised during the late contest. Even our manufactures will prosper, with the Continent of Europe and America open.—ANNUITANTS will, indeed, suffer by the progress of taxation: but that is the consequence of their taking themselves out of the circle of activity of productive wealth, and of national prosperity. In the revolutions of property the DRONES OF THE STATE WILL NATURALLY FALL TO

"THE BOTTOM. The nation has prospered under a war, and may do so again, notwithstanding the predictions of croakers a thousand times falsified. Internally Britain has enjoyed perfect tranquillity, improvements and riches increasing in every part. If war then be forced upon us, let us weigh the advantages as well as the disadvantages with which we shall enter upon the contest. The only ground of uneasiness will be in our FINANCES; but these with a prudent and skilful management may be made, with their usual ELASTICITY, to *adapt themselves to the occasions*, as they arise."

Such, my lord, is the language of the great partizans of war. You see, they are already paving the way for a seizure of the *funded property* by stigmatizing the owners as DRONES OF THE STATE, whose fall to the *bottom* they seem to contemplate without the smallest degree of pain or inquietude. In short, rather than not gratify their vindictive feelings against the ruler and the people of France, they seem perfectly ready to involve England in all the miseries of *Revolution*; for, I am sure your lordship wants nothing from me to convince you, that the measures here plainly hinted at would plunge the country into general confusion and blood-shed.

Whether the "*public voice*" will be for war we shall, probably, soon see, but, who would have expected to hear those, who are accusing Napoleon of a *design* to go to war to *gratify his army*, urging you to go to war, because war will please our *naval and military men*! and because (as it is *falsely* asserted) war will gratify the *cupidity* of landholders, farmers, ship-owners, merchants, and manufacturers! Was there ever before urged such reasons in justification of war?

But, my lord, long as this address to you already is, there is one view of this impending danger, to which I must yet beg leave to call your serious attention.

It is said, that "war will, as hitherto favour our *shipping and commercial interests*, while our navy secures us *the sovereignty of the seas*." And, afterwards, it is said, that our "Manufacturers will prosper with the continuation of Europe and *America* open."

Does not the very name of *America*, coupled with that of *war* in Europe, give

rise to a thousand thoughts in the mind of your Lordship? Do you not see the rising navy in the mouths of the *Susqueanah* and the *Hudson*?—In short, what Englishman can look *that way* without alarm? It is well known, that our commerce and shipping, during the last war, were supported by the restrictions, which our navy enabled us to impose on the commerce and navigation of *neutrals*, and especially on those of *America*. It is well known, that, had we not claimed the sea as our own, and exercised our power there accordingly, our commerce and navigation must have dwindled into a very small compass, and that those of *America* would have been swelled to an enormous size, while France, open to the shipping and commerce of *America*, would have experienced little injury from the power of our navy.

Well, then, is it to be believed, when we look at the progress and conclusion of the American war, that we shall again *attempt* those restrictions on her commerce and navigation? This is not to be believed; and, if we were to attempt them, is it to be believed, that we should not instantly find *America a party in the war against us*? The late event in France, will excite, in *America*, joy unbounded, and especially amongst those against whom the malicious shafts of the editors of our newspapers were levelled. When they hear these men describe Napoleon as a "*traitor* and a *rebel*," they will recollect, that the very same men described the President, their constitutional Chief Magistrate, as "*a traitor* and "*a rebel*," and that they called upon his fellow citizens, who had freely chosen him, to depose him and *kill* him. The Americans, my Lord, are not to be made believe, that Napoleon has *forced* himself upon the French nation; they are not to be made believe, that he has none but the army on his side; they are not to be made believe, that he is merely the head of "*a band of Janisaries*;" they are not to be made believe, that, with a mere handful of soldiers, he could have marched from Cannes to Paris, unless he had been *the man of the people*; they are not to be made believe, that the Bourbons would have fled from a throne and from the sovereignty over 30 millions of people, unless they had been convinced, that that *people* were on the side of Napoleon; they are not to be made

believe all, or any, of these things; but they will see, in this event, a proof of the fact, of which fact some of them before doubted, that Napoleon reigns in virtue of the love and the choice of the French nation.

The American Government will, for a while, at least, be disposed to remain at peace with us; but we may be well assured, that it will never again submit to any restrictions on its commerce and navigation, not warranted by the well-known and universally acknowledged law of nations; and, it would not be at all surprising, if it should lean very strongly towards France, if we were to make war upon the latter for the purpose of dictating a Government to her in direct opposition to her will, now so clearly declared.

Here, therefore, is a difficulty, which we had not to contend with in the last war. These prizes, which this writer holds out as a bait to our naval officers and their connexions, would not be so numerous. Indeed they would be very few in number. The commerce of France would, to a great extent, be carried on in American ships. America would be the carrier for both nations. The increase of her navigation would signify nothing at all to France; indeed, France would rejoice at it, because it would be tremendously dangerous to us.

Let no flatterer persuade your Lordship, that the Americans are to be either wheedled or corrupted. They love peace; but they are a wise people, and they will well know, that they must provide for war. The last year has taught them, that they must depend solely on their arms. They will remember the flames at Frenchtown, Stonington and Washington. They will remember their sufferings from the hands of our Indian allies. They will remember our considering their naturalized citizens as *traitors*. But, above all things, they will remember this: that, the moment Napoleon was down, and we had no enemy to contend with in Europe, our newspapers inculcated the necessity of *subduing* America; of *punishing* her; of *destroying her form of Government*; of *dividing her States*; of getting rid of this *example* of the success of *Democratic rebellion*. They will remember, too, that our presses called their *President* a *traitor* and a *rebel*; that they vowed *never to have peace with*

him; that they called upon the people to kill him. They will remember, that even the Prime Minister, in his place, stated, that, from the kind treatment of our prisoners of war in America, it appeared that a part, at least, of the people of that country *wished to put themselves under his Majesty's protection*. They will be well convinced, that from *utter ruin and subjugation* they have been preserved by the wisdom of their Government, the patriotism of themselves, and the skill and bravery of their navy and army; and not by any forbearance on our part. In short, when we look back to what has passed during the last year, can we, if we go to war with Napoleon, suppose it *wonderful* if the Americans prepare themselves *immediately* for taking any advantage of any circumstances, which that war might offer, to deal us such a blow as would, for ever after, put it out of our power to bring their independence into danger?

The return of Napoleon will necessarily produce great satisfaction in America; because, the Bourbons were essentially her enemies. Talleyrand had lent his aid to the annihilation of the last of *Republics* in Europe. All Europe seemed to be bound down *for ever*, or at least, *for ages*, within the lines and limits of the monarchs at Vienna. They and their ministers, without reference to the wishes of any body of people, inhabiting any of the transferred countries, had disposed of the whole at their will. All the ligatures were prepared and put in their places, the tying of the last knot being all that was wanted. Your Lordship says, that this was done with the sole view of insuring long tranquillity and happiness to Europe. I dare say it was; but different men view the same transactions in a different light. America would see this grand work with great pain; and, of course she would rejoice at that event which, in a moment, has snapped all the ligatures and blown them to the winds. Our great naval power, and especially the disposition which we have evinced to use that power, when occasion offered, against the commerce, the shipping, and even the soil of America, will naturally induce her to wish to see us enfeebled. It will be impossible for an American to look back to the flames of Washington and the plunder of Alexandria, without wishing earnestly to see our

power reduced. And, in this temper of mind, is it not to be feared, is it not to be expected, that, if we are at war with Napoleon only a few years, some occasion will be seized on by America to assist in reducing us to a state which will relieve her from all future apprehensions of hostility from us? Napoleon, who has now seen of what stuff America is made, of what importance she is, and of what greater importance she will be, and *must* be, in the world, will take special care to cherish her friendship, to gratify her merchants and traders, to treat her Government with respect. America and France have no objects of *rivalship*. Neither is *afraid* of the other. The products of one are wanted by the other. The growth of the power of each tends to the good of both. Both, from unhappy circumstances and events, are the bitter enemies of England; and, if we go to war with France, at this time, and without such grounds as shall justify war in the eyes of all the world, have we not reason to fear, that we shall have America also for an enemy.

My Lord, in conclusion, let me beg of you to observe what mighty mischief has been done by the vile men, who conduct the principal of our London newspapers. In America, where our language is the language of the country, all our threats have been repeated through a thousand channels. There is not a single man, or boy of ten years of age, in all that vast country, who has not read the outrageous abuse and the insolent and bloody denunciations of the *Times* newspaper against the President, the Congress, the People of America. Not a soul of them has failed to see their country marked out for plunder and subjugation; themselves for chastisement, or, in the words of wise Curtis, for “*a confounded good flogging*”; their President as a man to be “*deposed*,” being “*a traitor and a rebel*.” Thus have been implanted in the minds of a people not given to passion, the feelings of hatred and revenge; feelings which cannot be eradicated for many years; feelings which must exist during the present generation; feelings which have already produced, and which must continue to produce, incalculable mischief to our country. At the present moment, these same vile men, are proceeding in precisely the same course. They denominate Napoleon—“*a traitor*”

“*and a rebel*,” they call him, just as they called Mr. MADISON, *imposter, liar, villain, slave, felon, coward*, and insist that he ought to be considered as out of the pale of all legal protection. They call upon all the world to come and scourge the French nation whom they call *thieves, slaves, blood-hounds, murderers, kill-kings*, and every thing else that is abominable. It is impossible that this language of our press should not produce a great and lasting mischief. Indeed, there is good reason to believe, that these writers have, in no small degree, contributed towards the facilitating of Napoleon's return. They have been continually holding up our army as the *conquerors of France*; they have incessantly laboured to vilify all those who shone in the French army; they have been marking men out for vengeance as *Jacobins, Regicides*, &c. they have been recommending and applauding every measure, tending to re-exalt the emigrants and to shake the property of the new proprietors. It was they who first urged the *restoration to the noblesse* of the national domains which remained unsold, a measure which could not be regarded as any thing less than a preliminary step to the ousting of the whole of the new proprietors; *a measure against which I repeatedly cautioned the King*; a measure, which, perhaps, more than any other, has contributed to his overthrow. Then, my Lord, the *falsehoods* of these men. Their wilful falsehoods. Their impudent fabrications. Their disgrace to the press, to literature, to the country, is now manifest to all men. It is to the readers, the silly or malicious pupils, of these wicked men that the French people have offered ridicule, scorn and insult in this hour of the people's triumph. One of these pupils, in the *COURIER* of Tuesday last writes from Brighton thus: “The only persons in France who appear in trouble about this event are the *poor English*. The roads are covered with them—their desperate haste—their *melancholy faces*—and their bad French—all serve to excite the risibility of the people of France as they pass through their country. I can assure you that they are not sparing of their *insolence* and *ridicule*, nor do they forget to charge you for what you take. I stopped at

“ a small inn for a few minutes, about
 “ 25 miles from Dieppe; at the door there
 “ were crowds of persons amusing
 “ themselves with remarks upon the
 “ English passengers. The news just
 “ then arrived of Bonaparte's approach
 “ to Paris, and probable entry in a few
 “ hours—all was vehemence and confu-
 “ sion, and *unbounded joy expressed.*
 “ “ *Notre Empereur,*” “ *Napoleon,*”
 “ *Napoleon le Grand,*” appeared to elec-
 “ trify and *fill their hearts with joy.*”
 —Here, then, my Lord, in spite of all
 their fabrications, peeps out the fact,
 that THE PEOPLE of France as well as
 the army are filled with *joy* at Napoleon's
 return. And why should the “ poor
 “ *English be in trouble and have melan-*
 “ *choly faces*” at this event? Strange in-
 deed, that they should sorrow for them-
 selves! It is their annoyance; it is their
 insolence, which has thus been repaid
 with ridicule and scorn. They had the
 audacity, to look upon France as a sort
 of colony of England; and in their sorrow,
 their melancholy faces, at Napoleon's re-
 turn, the people of France saw no feeble
 proof, that that return was for the good
 and for the honour of France.

Thus, my Lord, have I given you my
 reasons for objecting to a war with
 France, either for the purpose of restor-
 ing the Bourbons, or for that of securing
 Belgium to the new King of the Nether-
 lands. I do not, I must confess, enter-
 tain very sanguine hopes, that this my
 advice will be attended with better suc-
 cess than that which I offered as to the
 commencement and prolongation of the
 unfortunate and disgraceful war against
 the American States; and, if, in spite of
 what I deem the plain dictates of sense
 and reason and love of country, this
 new war is to be waged, I have only to
 add my sincere wishes, that my predic-
 tions may not, in this case, as in the for-
 mer, be so completely fulfilled.

I am, &c. Wm. COBBETT.

Botley, 30th March, 1815.

WAR WITH FRANCE.

Mr. COBBETT.—The praiseworthy,
 the patriotic and honourable exertions
 which you are now making, to avert the
 calamities consequent on a renewal of
 the war with France, call for the sup-
 port of every real friend to his country.

Feeble as my pen is, when compared
 with your herculean labours, and the
 powerful energies of your mind, I feel it
 to be my duty to raise my voice, at this
 awful moment, against the prosecution of
 measures which have already proved so
 fatal to our national prosperity, that,
 in place of Great Britain now occupying
 the proud eminence, from which she
 commanded the homage of nations, she
 appears, alas! to be fast verging to a state
 of irretrievable ruin, and to have become
 an object of contempt amongst those
 who formerly envied her greatness.
 What a terrible, what a useful lesson has
 the American war taught our rulers, if
 they are at all capable of being taught
 by misfortunes!—Only a few short
 months before, they formed the resolu-
 tion of overthrowing democracy, of ex-
 tinguishing republicanism or the other
 side the Atlantic, we had acquired the
 renown of having defeated, in nume-
 rous battles, the soldiers of a nation
 that had, for twenty years, overawed the
 Continent of Europe, and that had dic-
 tated terms, in their very capitals, to all
 its sovereigns, who considered them-
 selves happy in being permitted to hold
 their crowns by the suffrance of the
 victors. Not only so, but to our power-
 ful exertions, it was owing that the great-
 est captain of the age, the man who
 could boast that victory had never de-
 serted his standard, was so completely
 subdued as to seek for safety in retire-
 ment, leaving the field of battle, the
 scene of all his glory, and that of the
 people who had so long exulted in his
 and their triumphs, in our full and un-
 disputed possession! What an elevated
 rank to hold in the scale of nations!
 What an enviable situation! Had the helm
 of the State been guided by pru-
 dence; had moderation influenced
 our national councils, we never could
 have been driven from this lofty
 pinnacle. Ages might have passed
 away, but Great Britain would have
 remained the admiration and the envy
 of the world. Pride, hatred and ambi-
 tion has subverted the stately fabric.
 Nothing would satisfy us but the over-
 throw of American independence. In
 place of attributing our successes here
 to a fortunate concurrence of circum-
 stances, we fancied ourselves *invincible.*
 We entered the contest vaunting of our
omnipotence. We *despised* the enemy

we had to encounter. Already we had made preparations for putting the seal upon the final subjugation of the American continent. Every friend of liberty stood aghast at the daring attempt. Every lover of his native land sighed, and his spirits sunk within him, when he contemplated the probability of its success. But, the charm of our invincibility has been broken; the talisman of our omnipotence, has been dissipated; and Britain, proud Britain, has fallen from the summit of her greatness! A band of *freemen*, whose Government she threatened to overthrow, to whom she arrogated the privilege of dictating the law, rushed forward in defence of their rights. The country which had been invaded, became the grave of the invaders. Even the ocean, on which she had so long ridden triumphant, was destined to witness her defeat and her disgrace. A reverse so unexpected, a change so sudden and extraordinary, naturally produced a correspondent feeling. The nations of Europe, who were formerly awed by the splendour of our victories, now began to question our pretensions. They no longer regarded us as invincible; they were indignant that they should have so long yielded us the rank which we possessed. This indignation, at what they considered their own weakness and folly, gave birth to feelings of hatred and contempt. The eagerness with which we sought an opportunity to enter into negotiations with America, was no way calculated to counteract this impression; and it only remained to complete the degradation, by finally making concessions to the foe we despised, which no other could expect or exact but one that had frustrated our designs, and driven us from the field.—At this critical moment, when our fame for deeds of arms has so fatally declined, the adversary, whom we had overthrown, and on whose re-appearance we never calculated, stands again into view.—He comes arrayed with tenfold more terrors than at any former period. If ever it was a matter of doubt that Napoleon possessed the hearts of the people of France, the reception which they have now given him must effectually remove it. Aheady he is said to have an army at his command of 500,000 veterans; and such is the attachment and devotion to his person which pervades all France, that he might

double that number in the course of one short month, if so tremendous a force was necessary to give stability to his throne, or even to extend his conquests.—It is impossible at present to divine his intentions. Circumstances may justify the opinion, that he will insist upon making the Rhine the boundary of France. If he should, it would be a wise policy in the allied powers not to oppose this. They have accused Napoleon of being *unbounded* in his ambition. Would it not be worth the trial, to give him those limits which nature has so clearly pointed out as belonging to the French Empire? Should he pass these, without cause of provocation, he might then be opposed as the common enemy of mankind. To war against him, in his present favourable situation in order to prevent his obtaining that object, would be folly; but to draw the sword for the purpose of reinstating the Bourbons, would be the extreme of madness.—In the former case the chances are two to one against his opponents: In the latter they are ten to one. If we calculate on the victories of Marquis Wellington, they will be met by our defeats at Fort Erie and New Orleans. If we speak of the entry of the Allies into Paris, we shall be told that treason no longer exists in the French army; that Napoleon never was defeated when the soldiers he led to battle were true to their colours. Our naval and military glory having been so greatly tarnished by the contest with America, and the fortunes of Napoleon having so greatly improved, it is lamentable to observe with what eagerness our ministerial newspapers are endeavouring to involve this country in a new war with France. Have these tools of corruption forgotten the arguments which they made use of, in the end of the year 1813, to dissuade the allies from giving peace to Europe? Are they not aware that the conclusions they *then* drew as to the favourable effect this would have upon France, *now* operate with double force against our taking up arms against her? The language of the *Courier* at that time was particularly striking and remarkable. In that journal of 25th December, it was said, “By peace, France will *gain every thing*. She will regain at least 300,000 of her best troops, one half of her best officers, and seamen sufficient to man 50 sail of

" the line.—In six months after a peace, France may have *fifty sail of the line*, well manned, and an army of *half a million of men*, commanded by a great military genius. One victory may again give him possession of Vienna."—The event here anticipated has actually happened. Napoleon has regained, by the peace, all his best troops, the greatest part of his best officers, and all his seamen. He possesses more than fifty sail of the line, and he has at his command half a million of armed men. If then the allied powers should provoke him to hostilities, let them beware that "*one victory does not again give him possession of Vienna.*"

II.

THE FARMERS.

MR. COBBETT.—A letter, under the signature of *Aristides*, has, it seems, given offence to sundry of your Correspondents, who seem impressed with the idea of his being hostile to farmers in general, whereas the contrary is the case; for while deprecating the now pending Corn Bill, as an arbitrary, partial, and unjust measure, no man entertains more affection, respect, and, I may say, veneration for the plain, rough, honest true old English Farmer, than *Aristides*; neither does any one more ardently wish, or would more earnestly endeavour, (overwhelmed as the nation is with Lords, Baronets, Knights, and Nabobs,) the renovation and multiplication of the ancient British Yeomanry.—But monopolizers of land, speculators and vile imitators of the luxuries of a court, cannot meet the approbation of a well wisher to his country; the more especially when, to enable themselves to continue such, they wish to put every mouth in that Country under tribute. Honest indignation in the cause of the poor, may then be allowed to burst forth.

Aristides agrees with the bulk, and better part of the nation, that Corruption and Taxation have gone hand in hand for a number of years; but wherefore good people of England do you now cry out against them?—You were in use to discourage, by all the means in your power, those who sought to rid you of the oppression; nay you lent your

willing aid to corruption to keep her in her seat; and now, forsooth, you pout and whine like way-ward Children.—

—A person of no small abilities, yet espousing the cause of the Corn Bill, uses the following most excellent remark, which, as it suits the cause of the people much better than the one in the service of which it is enlisted, you will permit me here to quote.—The writer says and says justly, that, "Equal protection is the right of all under a free government. All must participate in the benefits of society, otherwise the bond of association loses its legitimate force, as in Asia, where a tyrannic partiality makes favoured Casts, and treats others as if they were not of the human species; or, to use the words of the poet, 'Nature's bastards not her sons.' Such favour and affection may do in Asiatic governments, but not in England".—

If this argument be just, let the ministers explain upon what foundation they proceed with regard to the Corn Bill; for certainly the land-holders and farmers form but a comparatively small part of the community.—The manufacturers exceed them greatly in number. Besides these, there is a multitude who belong to neither of the above classes.—Yet *all* are to be oppressed, that the farmer may be enabled to pay a rack-rent to the land-holder, and therefore the land-holder seated in power, most unfeelingly lays it on. Having, in the above quotation, mentioned Asia, give me leave, Mr Cobbett, to ask some little information as to a transaction mentioned to have happened there some years ago. I mean a monopoly of rice, said to have caused the death of several millions of persons, who may be presumed to have been neither land-holders nor farmers, but of nearly a similar description with our manufacturers and labouring poor. Perhaps the corn bill may be meant as an experiment (upon a smaller scale) to take place here, according to an idea held by an author of the fashionable world, that there may at times be political wisdom in *diminishing* the population; and for that perhaps could be found no better expedient than the CORN BILL. ARISTIDES.